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I. Introduction
In Commonwealth v. Morris,1 the Supreme Court of Virginia
properly decided that the writs of coram vobis and audita querela
may not be used to modify a final criminal conviction order more
than twenty-one days after its entry.2 The court decided the
inapplicability of coram vobis under Virginia Code § 8.01-6773
and its own precedent.4 It decided the inapplicability of audita
querela under the English common law, citing cases from 1670,
1701, and 1792.5 In the course of the opinion it conflated Virginia
Code §§ 1-200 and 1-2016 and held in dictum that Virginia’s
adoption of the common law of England “ends in 1607 . . . . From
 Horace is a judge of an inferior Virginia court and a graduate of
Washington and Lee School of Law.
1. 705 S.E.2d 503 (Va. 2011).
2. See id. at 509 (finding that the alleged errors of fact were not sufficient
for the purposes of coram vobis and holding that the “writ of audita querela may
not be used to seek postconviction relief from criminal sentences”).
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-677 (2012).
4. See Morris, 705 S.E.2d at 506–08 (discussing the coram vobis issue).
5. See id. at 508–09 (discussing the audita querela issue).
6. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 1-200, -201 (2012).
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that time forward, the common law we recognize is that which
has developed in Virginia.”7 This was dictum because the opinion
holds the common law of England on the use of the writ of audita
querela was the same before and after 1607.8 Your author
submits this dictum is erroneous considering the years of decision
of the English cases cited, the plain meaning of the two applicable
statutes, and the court’s own precedent.
Blackstone did not believe the common law of England had
any force in the American colonies. 9 Colonial and republican
legislation rendered unnecessary a theoretical inquiry on the
subject in Virginia. After the Restoration, the General Assembly
in a preamble to a restatement of the law “endeavoured in all
things (as neere as the capacity and constitution of this country
would admitt) to addhere to those excellent and often refined
laws of England, to which we profess and acknowledge all due
obedience and reverence.”10 The convention that enacted
Virginia’s Declaration of Rights and first Constitution in May of
1776 also ordained:
That the common law of England, all statutes or acts of
parliament made in aid of the common law prior to the fourth
year of the reign of king James the first, and which are of a
general nature, not local to that kingdom, together with
several acts of the general assembly of this colony now in
force, . . . shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered
as in full force, until the same shall be altered by the
legislative power of this colony.11

7. Commonwealth v. Morris, 705 S.E.2d 503, 508 (Va. 2011).
8. See id. at 509 (“[T]he writ of audita querela, which was part of the
common law prior to 1607, is the law of the Commonwealth.”).
9. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *107–08 (noting that “the
common law of England, as such, has no allowance or authority there”).
10. Preamble to the Acts of the General Assembly of 1661–62, in 2 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OR VIRGINIA, FROM THE
FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619 41, 43 (William W. Hening
ed. 1823) [hereinafter HENING’S STATUTES AT LARGE]. Note that the spellings in
this and all subsequent quotations have been carried over from the original text.
11. Ordinances of Convention, May 1776, Chap. V, §VI, in 9 HENING’S
STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 10, at 126, 127. “As a general rule a statute
speaks as of the time it takes effect and not as of the time it was passed.” Cnty.
Sch. Bd. of Fairfax Cnty. v. Town of Herndon, 75 S.E.2d 474, 477 (Va. 1953)
(citation omitted). The ordinance did not have a delayed effective date, nor did it
have an effective date of 1607. It must have spoken as of 1776. In 1789, the
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The phrase “prior to the fourth year of the reign of king James
the first” modifies only “statutes or acts of parliament.” Any
doubt about that is resolved by the phrases: “which are of a
general nature, not local to that kingdom.” Although some local
customs were sometimes referred to as the common law, the
common law properly understood was of a general nature
throughout England, the ius commune.12 Furthermore, it was the
common law of England and of no force in Scotland, the Isle of
Man, or the Channel Islands.13 It would be nonsense to apply
these phrases to “the common law of England.” By contrast, acts
of Parliament applied to England and (from 1707 on) Scotland,
unless Scotland was specifically exempted, and applied to
dependencies of the Crown and colonies if specifically included. 14
Thus, an act of Parliament could be of a general nature, not local
to England. The Supreme Court of Virginia so construed the
ordinance (without the parsing) in Foster v. Commonwealth.15
This ordinance is now codified at Virginia Code §§ 1-200 and 201,
which confirm this interpretation of it.
II. The Statutes
Virginia Code § 1-200 provides:

General Assembly repealed so much of the ordinance as adopted the acts of
Parliament, see Laws of Virginia, October 1789, Chap. XVII, §1, in 13 HENING’S
STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 10, at 23, 23–24, but postponed its effective date
until 1793. See An Act Repealing, Under Certain Restrictions, All Statutes or
Acts of the Parliament of Great Britain, Heretofore in Force within this
Commonwealth, in THE REVISED CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 135, 135–37
(1819). The ordinance, as amended, was divided into the two present statutes in
the Virginia Code of 1849, Title 9, §§ 1 and 2. The statutes have had only a few
stylistic amendments since then.
12. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *63, *67–68 (describing what was
understood to be the “common law”).
13. See id. at *98, *105–06 (discussing the scope of the common law of
England).
14. See id. at *105–08 (discussing the areas that are governed by the
common law of England); R. v. Cowle, (1759) 97 Eng. Rep. 587 (K.B.) 598; 2
Burr. 834, 853 (noting that even if Berwick was “no part of the realm of
England,” it was still a “dominion of the Crown”).
15. 31 S.E. 503 (Va. 1898). The Supreme Court of Virginia also seems to
have so construed the ordinance in Hanriot v. Sherwood, 82 Va. 1, 15 (1884).
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The common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to
the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this
Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same,
and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General
Assembly.

Virginia Code § 1-201 provides:
The right and benefit of all writs, remedial and judicial, given
by any statute or act of Parliament, made in aid of the
common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the
First, of a general nature, not local to England, shall still be
saved, insofar as the same are consistent with the Bill of
Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth and the Acts of
Assembly.

The latter statute explicitly limits writs made in aid of the
common law by statute or act of Parliament to those in existence
in 1607.16 The former statute contains no such limitation.
“Rule of decision,” the phrase used both in the ordinance and
§ 1-200, is the principle upon which a disputed issue in a case is
decided. That was the use of the phrase in the English courts at
the time of the American Revolution,17 and in the courts of
Virginia before and after the Revolution.18 One of the English
decisions, Somerset’s Case,19 would have been well known to the
16. It seems certain that the writ of audita querela was first used during
the reign of Edward III (1327–1377). It is uncertain, however, whether the writ
was created in the courts or by an act of Parliament. See THEODORE F. T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 393–94 (1956) (noting that
there are grounds for believing the writ was authorized by Parliament in 1336);
ALFRED W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE
OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT, 131–32 (1975) (discussing the development of the
writ of audita querela). Therefore, Morris could not have been decided solely
under §§ 1-201.
17. See generally Campbell v. Hall, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1045 (K.B.) 1047; 1
Cowp. 204, 208; Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.) 509; 1 Lofft
1, 18; Triquet v. Bath, (1764) 97 Eng. Rep. 936 (K.B.) 938; 3 Burr. 1478, 1481;
Hamilton v. Mendes, (1761) 97 Eng. Rep. 787 (K.B.) 792; 3 Burr. 1198, 1209;
Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, (1752) 161 Eng. Rep. 782 (Consistory) 787, 2 Hag.
Con. 395, 408.
18. See generally Watson & Hartshorne v. Alexander, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 340,
353 (1794); Kennon v. M’Roberts, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 96, 99 (1792); Shelton v.
Shelton, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 53, 55 (1791); Giles v. Mallecote, 2 Va. Col. Dec. B71,
B75 (Gen. Ct. 1738), in THOMAS JEFFERSON, REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN
THE GENERAL COURT OF VIRGINIA 52, 56 (1829); infra note 31 and accompanying
text.
19. Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.) 509; 1 Lofft 1, 18.
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members of the Convention of 1776. There, Lord Mansfield
granted a writ of habeas corpus freeing a slave who had been
purchased in Virginia and brought to England by his master.20
If you think this is entirely an academic dispute among
antiquarians, consider first that the Supreme Court of Virginia
has relied on or cited English cases four times since January
2011. Consider second the experience that most Virginia
attorneys have had at some time. You try to find authority for
some basic principle of nonstatutory law in Michie’s
Jurisprudence. You find a statement that precisely fits your need,
and you look at the footnote for the citation. The only case cited is
a decision of the Supreme Court of West Virginia. If the principle
of law in question was decided in the English courts and none of
the exceptions in the statute apply,21 § 1-200 provides that the
common law of England is “in full force” and makes it your “rule
of decision.” Nothing ambiguous there. But is it the common law
of 1607 or 1776?
III. The Court’s Precedent
The competence of a wife to testify in a case in which her
husband was not immediately but might eventually be interested
was the issue in Baring v. Reeder.22 The court held 3–2 that she
was competent. The practice at the time was for the judges to
give separate opinions. Judge St. George Tucker, who three years
earlier had published the American edition of Blackstone’s
Commentaries, believed she was not competent and cited an
English case:
20. See id. at 510, 1 Lofft at 19 (“Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may
follow from the decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by the law
of England . . . .”).
21. There is also the judicially created “incompatible with our situation”
exception. See infra notes 35–38, 46, and 51 and accompanying text. The
exception seems to have its origin in Thornton v. Smith, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 81
(1792), which found that a declaration in an inferior court must allege that the
cause sued upon was “within the jurisdiction of the court,” and in Coleman v.
Moody, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 1, 20 (1809), which noted that the application of
the common law “adapt[s] . . . to the circumstances of the case” when approving
the provision of refreshments to jurors in violation of the English rule.
22. 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 154 (1806).
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The case . . . which I cite [is] not [ ] a precedent, (for no
decision in England since our independence commenced, has
any authority in this Court,) but merely as an apposite case
decided by able Judges upon the same law which as to this
point prevails in this country.23

Judge Tucker’s nemesis on the court,24 Judge Spencer Roane
(who was in the majority), then went on for two pages about the
precedential effect of English decisions. He sometimes sacrificed
clarity for floridity, and he somewhat mischaracterized Judge
Tucker’s opinion, but he seems not to have felt himself bound by
any English decision, especially an older one. However, he wrote
that he could avail himself of English decisions before and after
the Revolution:
I do not see why, upon principles of stable and unvarying law,
such as those of evidence, for example, the epoch of our
independence should be clutched with so much avidity: nor
that, in relation to such principles, the testimony of Lord
Mansfield delivered in 1777, is not of equal weight with his
testimony delivered in 1775. I wish it, however, to be clearly
understood, that I would not only confine the reception of the
modern decisions in England to doctrines of this description,
but would not receive even them, as binding authority. I would
receive them merely as affording evidence of the opinions of
eminent Judges as to the doctrines in question, who have at
least as great opportunities to form correct opinions as we
have, and are influenced by no motives but such as are
common to ourselves: and with respect to ancient decisions in
England, what Judge would wish to go further? Who will
contend that they are binding authorities upon us, in all cases
whatsoever? Shall we not have the privilege every day
exercised in England, of detecting errors of former times? . . .
[B]ut certain I am, that inasmuch as from the very outset of
our independence up to this day, this Court, and perhaps every
other Court in the union, has been in the habit of inspecting
and acting upon the modern decisions in England, under the
restriction I have mentioned; and as those decisions have
become the basis of their judgments, great inconvenience and
23. Id. at 158. Had Tucker seen the Morris dictum coming, his time might
have been better spent preparing an American edition of the first edition of Sir
Edward Coke’s Institutes of the Laws of England (1628) rather than William
Blackstone’s Commentaries.
24. See Charles F. Hobson, St. George Tucker, Spencer Roane, and the
Virginia Court of Appeals, 1804–11, 121 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 1, 2–43
(2013) (describing Judge Tucker’s relationship with Judge Roane).
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mischief would result from making a sudden alteration in this
particular; thereby shaking the authority of our own solemn
decisions, and re-establishing the authority of such ancient
decisions in England, as the modern ones, in both countries,
had detected of error and exploded.25

Are we to believe that the Convention of 1776, which rebelled
against the Whiggish Hanoverian regime, intended to adopt as
the rule of decision in republican Virginia the law of England of
the early years of Stuart absolutism when the notion of
Parliamentary supremacy was unheard of and the right to habeas
corpus was not secure?26
Some support for 1607 as the time of adoption can be found
in the opinion of Judge John Green in Stout v. Jackson.27 The
issue there was the measure of damages a purchaser of land
could recover from the seller in an action of covenant based on a
breach of the seller’s warranty of title when the purchaser was
evicted from the land. To oversimplify, Judge Green held the
purchaser could recover the value of the land at the time of
purchase under the ancient action of warrantia chartae. “Thus
stood the law in England when Virginia was settled, and is now
our law . . . .”28 Judge Green did not, however, write that our
adoption of the common law ended in 1607.
Judge John Coalter held warrantia chartae was an obsolete
action based on feudal principles that never existed in Virginia.
He would have given damages equal to the value of the land at
eviction.29 Judge Francis Brooke agreed with Judge Green on the
measure of damages on a narrower basis and “regretted that,
there being but a bare Court, it is not to be finally settled in this
case.”30 Two of the five members of the court did not participate
in the decision.31
25. Baring, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) at 162–63.
26. See WINSTON CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLES,
THE NEW WORLD 154–57 (1990) (discussing the role of Parliament and the King
in England during the early seventeenth century); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9,
at *134–35 (discussing the writ of habeas corpus in the seventeenth century and
abuses that served to defeat the benefit of “this great constitutional remedy”).
27. 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 132 (1823).
28. Id. at 146.
29. Id. at 155–71.
30. Id. at 171.
31. Additional support for 1607 as the year of demarcation can be found in
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed
forty years ago that “Virginia courts have applied [§ 1-200] to
justify reliance on contemporary as well as pre-enactment
common law doctrines.”32 In Long v. Vlasic Food Products Co.,33
the Fourth Circuit cited Foster v. Commonwealth,34 which
adopted the common law rule that a boy under the age of fourteen
was conclusively incapable of committing or attempting to
commit rape, whatever may be the real facts.35 The court in
Foster cited Hale’s Historia Placitorum Coronae (1736) and
English cases decided between 1828 and 1893.36 The court also
compared Virginia’s adoption of the common law and British
statutes:
Although, by the terms of the ordinance of 1776, the common
law was adopted generally and without a qualification similar
to that annexed to the adoption of the British statutes, yet it
has always been considered that the same principle governs
the adoption of the common law. Such of its doctrines and
principles as are repugnant to the nature and character of our
political system, or which the different and varied
circumstances of our country render inapplicable to us, are
the opinion of Justice James Iredell, a North Carolinian, sitting as a circuit
court judge in United States. v. Mundel, 10 Va. (6 Call) 245 (1795). The issue
was whether the marshal had a right to require bail of a defendant arrested in
an action of debt at the instance of the United States under an act of Congress.
Id. at 253. Justice Iredell concluded that Virginia law controlled as Congress
had not passed a statute on the issue and that the law of Virginia included “the
common and statute law of England, as they existed in England, at the time of
the first settlement of the country” so far as they were applicable to its situation
and had not been altered by the General Assembly. Id. at 260–61, 263–64, 266.
He made no reference to the ordinance or to the repeal of British statutes, see
supra note 11 and accompanying text, but then the facts stated do not indicate if
Mundel’s arrest occurred before or after 1793. In any event, these statements
were dicta as Justice Iredell decided a 1788 Virginia statute controlled and was
the “rule of decision.” Id. at 268.
32. Long v. Vlasic Food Prods. Co., 439 F.2d 229, 231 (4th Cir. 1971).
33. 439 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1971).
34. 31 S.E. 503 (Va. 1898).
35. See id. at 505 (concluding that the common law rule applies, presuming
“the accused being under fourteen years of age . . . to be incapable of committing
the crime of rape”). This was changed by 1994 Acts of Assembly, c. 339. See VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-61 (2012) (failing to distinguish between accused rapists over
and under the age of fourteen).
36. See Foster, 31 S.E. at 503 (providing English sources for the common
law rule at issue).
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either not in force here, or must be so modified in their
application as to adapt them to our condition. It is a
reasonable and substantial compliance with the common law,
“‘whose peculiar beauty is that it adapts itself to the rights of
parties under every change of circumstances,”’ rather than a
literal one, which is exacted by its adoption.37

Thus, the parts of English common law not in force in Virginia
were to be determined not by their vintage but by their
compatibility with our political system and circumstances.38
In U.S. Fidelity Co. v. Carter,39 a bank holding a deposit of
state and county taxes “closed its doors,” and the bank’s surety
paid the county treasurer the amount on deposit, was subrogated
to the treasurer’s rights against the bank’s receivers, and brought
suit against them.40 The court framed the issues thus:
The [surety’s] major premise, upon which its whole contention
rests, is that, by virtue of the adoption by Virginia of the
common law of England, the Commonwealth became entitled,
in the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, to
have a debt due to it from an insolvent bank, which has arisen
from the deposit of public funds therein for or by it, paid in
preference to the general depositors and other general
creditors of the bank. If this be not true, there is no basis for
the preference to which it contends the county and county
treasurer are entitled.
To determine whether this primary contention of the appellant
is well made, it is necessary to consider two questions:
(1) What was the common law of England, as understood at
the time of the American Revolution, with reference to the
right of the king, or crown, to have his, or its, debt paid in
preference to a debt due by his, or its, debtor to another
creditor? (2) To what extent, if any, has the Commonwealth of
Virginia adopted the common law of England on this subject
as being applicable to debts due it;41

37. Id. at 504–05 (citations omitted).
38. See Shirley v. Shirley, 525 S.E.2d 274, 276–77 (Va. 2000) (making no
mention of 1607 and relying on an 1840 English decision in holding that the
common law rule barring a reservation to a stranger to the deed was not
incompatible with Virginia jurisprudence). Three of the justices in Shirley were
also on the Morris court.
39. 170 S.E. 764 (Va. 1933).
40. Id. at 764–65.
41. Id. at 766.
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There followed a lengthy discussion of English law related to
the King’s right to a preference over a debtor’s other creditors,
and whether the Commonwealth acceded to the King’s rights by
the adoption of the common law. The court found that the
common law regarding the King’s prerogative to have his debts
preferred had not been adopted in Virginia without modification,
and it held the Commonwealth did not have such rights for
commercial debts owed to it, such as deposits in a bank.42 Thus,
its examination of the common law “as understood at the time of
the American Revolution” could be considered dictum.43
As county taxes were included in the money the treasurer
had deposited in the bank, the court also had to consider whether
the county was entitled to a preference. The court held it was not
so entitled:
In our rather extensive examination of the English precedents
and authorities we have found no authority which even
intimates that at the time of the American Revolution any
political subdivision of the kingdom or body politic was
regarded as being entitled under the common law of England
to have its debts preferred.44

This was not dictum. The decision was unanimous—six of the
seven justices participated, and Judge Tucker was vindicated.
The court in Morris made no mention of U.S. Fidelity.
Since Foster and before Morris, when the court cited § 1-200
(or its predecessors) and English cases and treatises as the rule of
decision, it more often cited cases decided and treatises written
after 1607.45
42. Id. at 773 (“In the view which we have taken of the case, neither the
Commonwealth, the county, nor the county treasurer was entitled to any
preference . . . .”).
43. Id. at 766.
44. Id. at 772.
45. See, e.g., Shirley v. Shirley, 525 S.E.2d 274, 276 (Va. 2000) (citing an
1840 case); Campbell v. Commonwealth, 431 S.E.2d 648, 651 (Va. 1993) (citing a
1727 case and postsettlement English treatises); Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d
861, 864–65 (Va. 1992) (citing Blackstone); Williamson v. The Old Brogue, 350
S.E.2d 621, 623 (Va. 1986) (citing a 1981 Maryland case); Bruce Farms v. Coupe,
247 S.E.2d 400, 402–03 (Va. 1978) (citing Coke, Littleton (1633) and declining to
follow 1931, 1938 and 1955 cases); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 189 S.E.2d 678,
679 (Va. 1972) (citing a 1603 case and then distinguishing it); Evans v. Asphalt
Roads, 72 S.E.2d 321, 327 (Va. 1952) (citing a 1595 case and Virginia cases on
the same issue); Carter v. Hinkle, 52 S.E.2d 135, 136 (Va. 1949) (citing an 1884
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In several cases the court has abrogated the common law as
previously declared, not because the previous authority was post1607, but because the court believed it was no longer compatible
with contemporary conditions. In Weishaupt v. Commonwealth,46
the defendant had been convicted of attempting to rape his wife
and claimed a husband could not be so convicted at common
law.47 The defendant relied on a statement from Hale that
supported his position.48 The court found that Hale’s statement
was not an accurate statement of the common law, and it cited
English decisions from 1721 through 1974 in support of its view. 49
However, it decided that even under those decisions Weishaupt’s
conviction would have to be reversed.50 Nonetheless, it affirmed
the conviction because the English common law on this subject,
even as of 1974, did not reflect the independence of women in
contemporary Virginia or “fit our way of life.”51
IV. Post-Morris Decisions
In Bevel v. Commonwealth,52 the court restated the Morris
dictum and cited Blackstone and a 1591 decision, Marsh and his
Wife,53 in concluding that the death of a convicted defendant did
case); Butts v. Commonwealth, 133 S.E. 764, 768 (Va. 1926) (citing an 1869
English case and several American cases); Wiseman v. Commonwealth, 130 S.E.
249, 251 (Va. 1925) (citing an 1801 case).
46. 315 S.E.2d 847 (Va. 1984).
47. See id. at 850 (explaining defendant’s claims that the statutory law had
not altered the common law rule adopted by Virginia).
48. See id. at 849–50 (quoting “17th century English jurist Sir Matthew
Hale” for the common law rule).
49. See id. at 850 (determining that “Hale’s statement was not law” and
that he “cites no authority for his view nor was it subsequently adopted, in its
entirety, by the English courts”).
50. See id. at 852 (“The English common law rule, if applied directly to this
case, would require us to reverse Weishaupt’s conviction.”).
51. Id. at 852–54. In three other cases, the court abrogated intrafamilial
tort immunity, but that was American common law, and no English cases or
treatises were cited. Surratt Adm’r. v. Thompson, 183 S.E.2d 200 (Va. 1971);
Smith v. Kauffman Adm’r, 183 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971); Midkiff v. Midkiff, 113
S.E.2d 875 (Va. 1960).
52. 717 S.E.2d 789 (Va. 2011).
53. (1591) 78 Eng. Rep. 481 (Q.B.) 528; Cro. Eliz. 225, 273.
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not cause the criminal case to abate.54 As Blackstone’s fourth
volume was cited, it is apparent English law on the question had
not changed by 1769. A postsettlement English decision was to
the same effect as Marsh.55
In Wyatt v. McDermott,56 a 4–3 decision, the majority
restated the Morris dictum and cited a 1599 decision, not as
authority for the new tort it recognized of tortious interference
with parental rights, but rather as some pedigree for it. 57 The
English case had held that a father had a cause of action for the
abduction of his heir but for no other child.58
In the court’s most recent reference to English common law,
Cline v. Dunlora South,59 the majority, in another 4–3 decision,
cited an 1890 English case regarding tort liability of adjoining
landowners.60 Neither the majority nor the dissenters mentioned
Morris.
* * * *
You may still be asking what practical effect any of this has.
The answer: The quantum and usefulness of authority available
to the Virginia judge or lawyer as the rule of decision. The
leading authority on Anglo-Virginian legal history has written:
[T]here are relatively few reports of decisions before 1607 and
many of these were, by the eighteenth century, antiquated by
later English developments or inapplicable to the social
conditions of Virginia, and thus of little use or authority.61

54. See Bevel, 717 S.E.2d at 795 (determining that the decision of whether
a criminal case will abate due to the death of the defendant is “more
appropriately decided by the legislature, not the courts”).
55. King v. Ayloff, (1689) 91 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.); 1 Salk. 295. The same
decision seems to be published at 90 Eng. Rep. 375, Comberbach 114.
56. 725 S.E.2d 555 (Va. 2012).
57. See id. at 564 (citing Barham v. Dennis, (1599) 78 Eng. Rep. 1001
(K.B.); Cro. Eliz. 770).
58. See id. (explaining that in Barham it was determined that “a father
could only seek the pecuniary loss of his heir’s marriage prospects under an
action of trespass for the taking of his heir”).
59. 726 S.E.2d 14 (Va. 2012).
60. See at 16 (citing Giles v. Walker, 24 Q.B.D. 656 (Eng. 1890)).
61. W. HAMILTON BRYSON, VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 2–9 (4th ed. 2005).
Full disclosure: the clause immediately preceding the quotation states, “English
cases decided after 1607 were taken to be persuasive rather than binding
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The decisions of the courts are the principal monuments of
the common law, the lex non scripta. 62 Before the Revolution,
Virginia’s judges were not lawyers and the General Court, the
colony’s highest, delivered no written opinions.63 There are no
extant reported decisions before 1728 or between 1741 and 1768,
and the reported decisions are mostly the arguments of the
reporter.64 Thus, much of Virginia’s colonial common law
development is truly a lex non scripta. If the 1607 line of
exclusion is taken strictly, we are deprived of almost two
centuries of authoritative common-law development and much of
the wisdom of Sir Edward Coke, Sir Matthew Hale, Blackstone,
and Lord Mansfield, the leading judges and writers of the
Augustan Age of the English common law.
As a dictum, the statement is not binding in future cases,
and it is of no real concern if we share Blackstone’s conclusion
that a subsequent change to the common law does not mean the
earlier decision was bad law, but that it was not law, it having
been erroneously determined.65 Nor is it of concern if post-1607
English cases are followed as the “common law of Virginia.” The
dictum was nonetheless an unforced66 error.
authority.” Id. It is believed the good professor is Jacobean on the question
presented.
62. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *63 (“The lex non scripta, or
unwritten law, includes . . . the common law properly so called . . . and, likewise
those particular laws, that are by custom observed only in certain courts and
jurisdictions.”).
63. See R. T. Barton, Introduction to 1 VIRGINIA COLONIAL DECISIONS 208–
12, 236 (1909) (noting that “[t]he chief colonial court, however, was the General
Court,” and it “delivered no written opinions, and generally gave no reasons at
all for their conclusions”).
64. See id. at 1 (explaining that Randolph’s Reports cover cases from 1728
to 1732 and Barradall’s Reports cover cases from 1733 to 1741); id. at 8–9
(explaining that Jefferson’s Reports cover cases from 1730 to 1740 and 1768 to
1772); 1 VIRGINIA COLONIAL DECISIONS R1-114 (providing Randolph’s reports); 2
VIRGINIA COLONIAL DECISIONS B1-383 (providing Barradall’s reports). Most of
the decisions of the earlier period in Jefferson’s Reports are from Randolph and
Barradall. Barton, supra note 63, at 8–9.
65. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *70 (“For if it be found that the
former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a
sentence was bad law, but that it was not law; that is, that it is not the
established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined.”).
66. Unforced for a second reason: no party in Morris on brief contended
that Virginia’s adoption of English common law ends in 1607.

